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Before the late 1970s, U.S. savings and loan  pressures to liberalize the activities of institu-
institutions (S&Ls) were primarily mutually-  tions inexperienced in the new activities.
owned institutions widi limited management ca-
pabilities, limited investment options, and  Parts of the industry were allowed to con-
virtually unlimited interest rate exposure.  tinue operating and assuming new risks despite
insolvency.  It was difficult for the government
The industry was closely tied to real estate  and banking authorities to acknowledge these
so conflicts of interest and concentrations of  losses and to pursue policies that would bring ,.n
credit were accepted. The regulatory-supervi-  end to them, and their delay in doing so in-
sory system was also closely tied to the industry  creased the costs and distortions in U.S. resource
so it had trouble idcntifying problems and  allocation.  Losses bome by the economy will be
imposing appropriate discipline.  paid for by the general public.
When interest rates escalated beyond imag-  Although the United States has a highly
inwd  levels, this borrow-short, lend-long industry  sophisticated and innovative mortgage market
suffered great operating losses, which depleted  that is not found in developing countries, the
modest capital levels in many S&Ls.  Interest  lessons of its failures in regulating and supervis-
rates and asset prices varied greatly, and S&Ls  ing the savings and loan industry are highly
were constrained in their ability to diversify and  relevant for the many developing countries that
hedge against risk.  Prudential supervision and  suffer from widespread distress in their financial
regulation were inadequate and were subject to  systems.
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Bibliography  52THE SAVINGS AND LOAN PROBLEM IN THE U.S.
During the past ten years savings and loan associations
(S&Ls) in the U.S. have encountered enormous interest rate and
credit quality problems.  During this same period, about 30 per
cent of the S&Ls have been closed or merged.  A large
percentage of those operating today are insolvent or
approaching insolvency, and they are not likely to survive.
The cost associated with closing insolvent S&Ls and paying the
remaining bill for those closed or merged in the past two years
is likely to exceed $100 billion on a present value basis, or
about two per cent of GDP.  Current federal budget estimates,
which include related borrowing costs, exceed $160 billion.
The case of S&Ls in the U.S. is of interest from a number
of perspectives to other countries, especially developing
countries that have experienced insolvency in their financial
system on a large scale.  While some aspects of the S&L
experience is distinctive, the overall experience in many
respects has close parallels with that of other financially
distressed systems.  In particular, the experience of
deregulation accompanied  by institutional and prudential
regulatory weaknesses and, ultimately, the recognition of
widespread losses, has similarities to experience elsewhere.-2-
The first section of this paper provides background on the
development of the industry's problems.  Section II discusses
various regulatory attempts to shore up S&Ls and Section III
covers the policies pursued in connection with closing or
merging insolvent S&Ls.  In Section IV the manner in which the
FDIC dealt with similar (though  smaller) problems encountered
by mutual savings banks (MSBs)  are compared with the handling
of S&L problems.  Section V covers more recent efforts to
resolve the S&L problem, and includes a discussion of the
legislation that was recently enacted to deal with the S&L
problem and how that legislation is likely to be implemented.
The final section provides a general summary and conclusions on
the causes of the S&L problem and the contribution of public
policy decisions to exacerbating the problem and magnifying its
costs.  The appendix includes statistical  data on S&L
performance and on interest rates that are intended to place
the discussion in better perspective.
I. Background
Savings and loan associations (S&Ls)  and mutual savings
banks (MSBs)  developed beginning in the 19th century as
institutions oriented toward the household saver and the
mortgage borrower.  While the institutions had somewhat
different origins and areas of geographic concentration (MSBs
were largely confined to New England and the Middle Atlantic-3-
states),  where S&L's were relatively less important, both
institutions  generally have been grouped together under the
heading of "thrift institutions" and they had certain common
characteristics.  Both were mutually owned and run by
self-perpetuating  boards of directors or trustees; both
concentrated investments in long-term fixed rate assets,
principally residential mortgage loans; and both were largely
funded by savings and time deposits from the household sector.
MSBs were state-chartered institutions  whose powers were
determined by state law.  For the most part, they had broader
investment powers which included consumer lending,
non-residential mortgages, corporate bonds and even some
corporate stock.  Most MSBs obtained FDIC deposit insurance
after it became available to them in the 1930s.
S&Ls were patterned after British building and loan
societies, and confined their lending activity to'home
mortgages.  Regulation of S&Ls, to the extent it existed prior
to the 1930s,  was handled at the state level.  In the 1930s
Congress established the Federal Home Loan Bank System, which
included three components: the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB); the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC);  and 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs).  The
FHLBB became the principal regulator for S&Ls.  Those obtaining
federal charters became subject to FHLBB regulation.  The
FSLIC, which provided deposit insurance coverage similar to
that provided to banks by the FDIC, was placed under and was- 4-
essentially managed by the FHLBB.  Federally chartered S&Ls
automatically obtained FSLIC insurance.  State-chartered S&Ls
could apply for and obtain FSLIC insurance, but if they did so
they became subject to FHLBB regulation.
Although the stock of the FHLBs was owned by member S&Ls,
the Boards of Directors of the FHLBs were partially selected by
the FHLBB which exerted certain other authority over them.  The
FHLBs could borrow in private financial markets and lend to
member institutions, primarily through advances collateralized
by mortgages.  Some of the supervisory functions of  the FHLBB
were delegated to the FHLBs, although examination activities
remained a function of the FHLBB.
The legislation establishing the FHLBB directed it to
encourage local thrift and home financing and to promote,
organize and develop thrift institutions.  For many years
critics of the Federal Home Loan Bank System have maintained
that S&L regulators have been too close to the industry and too
concerned with advancing its, as opposed to the public's,
interest.  The ownership and governanc- of the FHLBs (and S&L
input into the supervisory process) has been questioned.  In
addition, the housing industry has always had strong ties to
S&Ls, and both industries have long played an important role in
U.S. politics, thereby politicizing many of the issues related
to regulation of S&Ls.  As a result, S&Ls and their principal
trade associations have frequently been able to use the-5-
political process to influence the regulation and supervision
of the industry.
Interest Rate Risk
Most of the assets of thrifts after the end of World War
II were home mortgages, and the typical mortgage instrument in
thrift portfolios between 1946 and 1980 was a fixed-rate
mortgage with an original maturity of 25 to 30 years on a
single family home.  A large percentage of these mortgages
carried some form of Government agency guarantee on most of the
loan principal.  Credit losses, even on mortgages without
Government guarantees, were low because of a variety of
factors, including a strong economy and generally rising home
prices.
Most economists and market observers had been concerned
for some time about the vulnerability of thrift institutions  to
rising interest rates.  In periods when interest rates did
increase, the deposit costs of thrifts rose faster than loan
income from a slowly changing portfolio, and as a result,
interest margins and earnings of thrifts  declined.  However,
until the late 1970s interest rates fluctuated within a
-relatively  narrow band so that interest rate exposure led to
few serious supervisory  problems among thrifts.  The impact of
ifnterest  rate fluctuations was lessened by several factors:-6-
institutions  did not have to mark to market their fixed rate
asset portfolios; few had to meet the disclosure requirements
of publicly-traded institutions; spreads between rates on new
loans and deposits were generally favorable; and deposit
interest ceilings limited rate competition among depository
institutions.  Even when individual institutions  approached
insolvency, they rarely faced serious liquidity problems
because most depositors were fully insured and the FHLBs
generally were willing lenders to S&Ls.
At various times there were efforts to expand the use of
variable rate mortgages which linked mortgage rates to deposit
costs or rates on marketable securities.  In some states,
notably California, variable rate mortgages were permitted for
state-chartered institutions.  At the federal Level, however,
consumer-oriented groups blocked efforts to permit variable
rate mortgages by federally chartered S&Ls.  In 1979 the FHLBB
authorized the use of mortgages with limited variable rate
features, and in 1981 restrictions on mortgage terms were
largely eliminated.  That turned out to be too late for many
institutions.  It should be noted that in some parts of the
country (particularly  New England) mortgages whose terms were
renegotiated every five years or so were not uncommon.  Such
instruments were also common for commercial mortgages of MSBs
and commercial banks.
Hindsight strongly indicates that S&Ls were under-pricing- 7-
risk in mortgage lending.  Typical instruments permitted the
borrower to prepay his fixed-rate loan balance with no more
than a modest penalty.  Thus, if rates dec'ined, "high rate"
loans were frequently prepaid so that the lender's exposure to
interest rate fluctuations was not a symmetrical one.
Competitive pressure among thrift institutions  and a strong
American tradition of subsidizing home ownership contributed to
the persistence of an extremely risky situation for mortgage
lenders.  (Some  would argue that competition forced the thrift
industry to pass on the subsidy it received as a result of
interest ceilings on time and savings deposits.)
Clearly, regulatory policy underestimated the risk.  While
most regulators might have preferred less interest rate risk,
they failed to champion the cause of variable rate mortgage
lending until serious problems developed.  A stock-owned thrift
industry that was responsive to investor requirements probably
would have been more sensitive to its interest rate exposure.
Mutual institutions  were not under pressure from market forces
to earn risk-adjusted equity returns on their capital
investment.  That, and limited legal investment options,
forestalled the appropriate market adjustments to the risky
environment for mortgage lenders.  It is not a coincidence that
California S&Ls, the first to become stock institutions,  were
most active and successful in gaining authority to make
variable rate mortgage loans.- 8-
II.  Problems  Faced  by  S&Ls  and  Responses to  Them
Increase in Interest  Rates
Despite their rate vulnerability, as long as interest
rate fluctuations  were moderate, fluctuations in S&L er  ngs
were also moderate.  That changed dramatically in the late
1970s when inflationary  pressure in the econotiy  boosted
interest rat.:s  substantially.  Treasury bill rates which had
averaged about 5.5 percent in 1977, averaged more than 10
percent in 1979; and peaked at close to 16 percent in 1981
(Table  2 in Appendix).  Depository institutions experienced
substantial deposit outflows, interest ceilings at banks and
thrifts  were raised, new deposit instruments  were developed,
and eventually deposit rate ceilings were eliminated
altogether.
As the cost of funds increased at S&Ls, their interest
margins declined sharply, tuvning negative in 1980 and
remaining negative through 1982.  As a result, S&Ls experienced
substantial operating losses.  If S&Ls had been required to
mark their mortgage portfolios to market at the time of peak
interest rates in 1981 and 1982, typical write downs would have
exceeded 20 percent, and virtually all S&Ls would have been-9-
insolvent.  In the apgregate book insolvency would have
approached $100 b.Ilion.
Several insolvent S&Ls were acquired by stronger
institutions in transactions in which FSLIC provided assistance
that covered the negative spread between the cout of funds and
yields on fixed rate m.rtgages.  In some instances acquiring
institutions obtained capital forbearances, that is, they were
exempt from prevailing capital standards for a specified,
sometimes lengthy, period.  Acquirers also received tax
benefits or opportunities to expand geographically that would
not have otherwise been available.  While these arrangements
were sometimes innovative and imaginative,  they did not always
serve the long-run interest of the industry or the public.
Attempts to Shore up  S&Ls
It became apparent to the FHLBB that FSLIC's resources
(its book net worth was about $6 billion in 1981) would be
depleted if it continued to provide substantial financial
assistance in order to close or merge failing S&Ls.  When the
FHLBB and Congress were unwilling to acknowledge the extent of
the problem, it became necessary to find ways to deal with the
S&L problem that did not involve cash outlays or obvious
comnpitments  from FSLIC.  The FHLBB and Congress attempted to
shore up reported industry earnings and net worth through a- 10  -
variety of devices, including "net worth certificates",
deferred losses on asset sales, and favorable accounting
treatment in  acquisitions of failing institutions.  Between
1980 and 1983 about 470 FSLIC-insured institutions (about 12
percent of the institutions)  were closed or merged to avoid
failure.  In the majority of these transactions FSLIC provided
little or no tangible financial assistance.  While the various
arrangements or devices employed did not contribute to "real"
earnings or net wort.h,  they bought time and delayed technical
insolvencies, or they dealt with insolvencies without
immediately tapping FSLIC resources.  (In some cases insolvent
S&Ls were simply allowed to continue to operate.)  This was
supposed to buy time until interest rates declined and/or the
institutions  could grow out of their problem.  Eventually
interest rates did decline and many S&Ls became profitable
again.  In the case of others, however, the unfavorable results
of the policies that they pursued more than offset the benefits
of lower interest rates.  Aggressive growth, sometimes through
lending in areas where the institution  had limited experience,
contributed to massive asset quality problems that began to
appear just when interest rate problems no longer seemed so
important.
Many S&Ls were allowed to operate even though they were
insolvent according to regulatory standards, and, until mid
1985, there were few restraints placed on their growth.
Indeed, the FHLBB reduced net worth requirements, at least in- 11  -
part, to prevent such requirements from restraining S&L growth.
This growth required S&Ls to pay high rates for their
deposits, and in order to offset the increased cost of funds
they pursued higher yielding (generally riskier) assets.
Unfortunately, many of these institutions  did not have the
staff to make such loans prudently; some were victimized by
dishonest operators inside  and outside their institutions;  and
real estate markets subsequently deteriorated most in precisely
those areas where loans could be most readily booked.
Federal legislation enacted in 1982 expanded lending
options for federally chartered thrifts.  Several states had
previously liberalized powers for state-chartered S&Ls.  Texas
had taken the lead much earlier in expanding what
state-chartered institutions  could do.  Direct investment
powers opened up riskier opportunities to institutions
searching for high return and willing to take risks, and many
used these powers poorly.  Capital requirements that were
insufficient  to cushion traditional S&L risks were certainly
not sufficient to cushion riskier activities.1/  In addition,
examination and supervisory staff and policies that were
developed for an industry that lent principally on single
family mortgages, were not prepared to deal with riskier asset
portfolios.
In the high interest rate environment that characterized
much of this period, spreads between rates on new mortgages and- 12 -
the cost of funds for thrifts (deposits and short-term
borrowings) were very high.  Growth afforded the opportunity to
raise  average  spreads  --  the spreads  on  "old"  loans  were
generally negative.  New loans also afforded up-front loan fees
which, according to then-prevailing accounting practices, could
be fully used to boost current earnings.  Commercial mortgages
provided even higher returns and less interest rate risk.  They
could most readily be booked in Texas and other "hot" real
estate areas in the west.  Growth, presumably, could improve
earnings and raise the value of solvent and .nsolvent S&Ls.
The FHLBB's past experience suggested that S&L problems came
principally from interest rate risk.  Credit risk was
substantially underestimated.
Despite the weakened condition of FSLYC-insured S&Ls, they
continued to grow rapidly during the period of distress under
discussion.  During the eight year period between year-end 1978
and year-end 1986 FSLIC-insured institutions grew by
approximately 125 per cent, a compound annual growth rate in
excess of 10 per cent.  A significant share of this growth was
financed through increased borrowing.2/  S&Ls in Texas grew by
approximately 230 per cent, a  compound annual growth rate of
approximately 18 per cent.  During this same period
FDIC-insured commercial banks, which were generally in better
financial condition, grew at a compound annual rate of about
7.5 per cent.- 13 -
When an insolvent institution is permitted to operate, it
has substantial incentive to "roll the dice" in order to try to
become solvent.  In other sectors of the economy creditors
would have long since forced these insolvent institutions into
bankruptcy.  However, where funding comes from
federally-insured  deposits and secured borrowings, most
creditors have little reason to exercise any discipline.  Given
this situation, it was essential that the FHLBB protect itself
and FSLIC, and close the insolvent institutions or, when that
was not possible, impose tough constraints on their growth and
lending.  Because this was not done soon en6ugh, what might
have been a manageable problem for FSLIC increased well beyond
its financial capacity to resolve it.
A  number of troubled S&Ls were purchased by investors for
very little cash.  Operating with enormous leverage and deposit
insurance, these institutions frequently took enormous risks,
sometimes in the hope of regaining solvency.  However, in
several situations, particularly in Texas, investors used the
funds of newly acquired S&Ls to finance projects where they had
substantial direct interests.  In some cases the financial
arrangements involved clear-cut fraud.  Some suggested that
buying a state-chartered stock S&L in Texas gave one "a license
to steal."
One can draw an analogy between the policies pursued by
many insolvent S&Ls and the insolvent FSLIC.  Just as insolvent- 14 -
S&Ls took great risk with the hope of becoming solvent, so did
the FHLBB and FSLIC incur substantial risk with the hope of
reestablishing a solvent deposit insurance system.  The result
turned out to be greater economic and financial costs to the
financial system and to the economy as a whole.3/
Improved Performance
Following the decline in interest rates in 1982, S&L
performance improved and, in the aggregate, the industry
reported modest positive earnings in 1983 and 1984.  When rates
declined further in 1985, the industry appeared to be returning
to respectable  earnings, at least in the aggregate.  However,
reported earnings declined sharply in 1986 and became negative
by the end of the year.  Despite a year-to-year  decline in the
cost of funds for S&Ls, earnings continued to deteriorate
throughout 1987 and, in the aggregate, the industry lost about
$8 billion.  These losses increased by about 50 per cent in
1988.
The earnings deterioration was primarily the result  of
asset quality problems (in some cases a belated recognition of
those problems) which led to increases in loan losses and a
reduction in interest margins because of the increase in
non-performing assets.  Hindsight suggests that earnings
reported in earlier years were overstated through interest- 15 -
accruals on loans that should have been placed on a non-accrual
status and by inadequate loan loss provisions.4/  In addition,
it appears that many S&Ls had selectively sold higher yielding
assets and usea these gains to maintain positive earnings,
while retaining lower yielding ana lower quality assets in
their portfolios.  It should be noted that aggregate S&L income
data mask considerable dispersion within the industry  and can
lead to understatement of the problem.  For example, while
two-t..irds  of the S&Ls were profitable in 1987 and earned $6.6
billion, the one-third that recorded losses for the year lost
more than $14 billion.
The asset quality problems of S&Ls werc importantly
affected by the substantial  weakness in residential and
commercial real estate markets in Texas and other parts of the
southwest.  However, the deterioration also occurred as a
result of the aggressive growth and lending policies pursued by
S&Ls and a supervisory  system that proved to be ineffective.
The aggressive and unrestrained lending by S&Ls in Texas
(including  some out-of-state S&Ls) was a  major contributor to
over-expansion in Texas residential and commercial construction
and to the extent of the subsequent decline.
Examination and Supervision
Historically, the Federal Home Loan Bank system relied- 16 -
heavily on detailed regulations  specifying what S&Ls could and
could not do.  Emphasis was placed on check lists and
conditions that had to be met as opposed to evaluating the
strength of borrowers and the quality of specific credits.  If
a loan had an appraisal and appropriate documentation, there
probably was no basis for criticism.  Indeed, it was probably
considered inappropriate  by the system for examiners or
supervisors to criticize loans or S&L activities if there were
no specific violation of the rules.  When virtually all S&L
loans were mortgages on single family homes, this behavior led
to few problems and it probably was not much different than the
treatment of such loans by commercial bank examiners.
Within the Home Loan Bank system, examination and
supervision  were separated.  Examiners worked for the FHLBB
(Washington  based) and were largely information  collectors.
Follow-up supervision, when it occurred, was carried out by a
separate staff employed by the FHLBs that rarely communicated
directly with the examination staff.  FHLB employees may have
been reluctant to criticize and enforce rigorously since they
were employed by a Board that was largely elected by supervised
S&Ls.
In 1985 the FHLBB took steps to upgrade the examination
and supervisory efforts of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
Some of the proposed increased staffing in 1985 and earlier was
opposed by the Administration which exercised budgetary control- 17 -
over FHLBB spending and sought to limit Government employment
and to limit "unnecessary" regulation.  This proved to be
shortsighted policy.  While supervisory standards within the
Home Loan Bank system did eventually improve, the improvement
came too late and to slowly to deal with emerging credit
problems effectively.  The quality and focus of S&L supervision
contributed to the slow recognition of emerging credit problems
and the failure to take appropriate remedial action.
The earlier focus of the Home Loan Bank system on making
sure that rules and regulations  were followed is very similar
to the bank regulatory activities of many developing countries.
Making sure that laws and rules are not violated does not
assure that banks or thrifts are operating in a safe and sound
manner.  Checklists of rules may have a perverse effect by
creating an illusion of appropriate behavior and soundness.
Perhaps the most dramatic shortfall occurred in connection with
construction lending on commercial real estate.  Accounting
rules permit interest accruals for several years during the
construction period even though no cash payments are made to
the lender.  In a weakening real estate market interest may be
accrued and loans may be considered  performing even though
close scrutiny will indicate that problems and likely losses
are present.  An examination process that failed to look at
underlying credits was slow to pick up on such problems, and
this especially occurred in connection with S&L supervision in
the southwest.- 18 -
III. Policies for Handling Failing S&Ls
The FSLIC, like the FDIC, traditionally used two methods
to handle failing institutions: (1) insured deposits were paid
by FSLIC which, acting as receiver, liquidated the assets of
the failed institution and distributed collections among
creditors; or (2) the failing institution  was merged (sometimes
after it was closed) into a healthy institution in a
transaction in which FSLIC generally purchased some of the
problem assets of the failing institution or otherwise provided
assistance to the acquiring institution.
S&L and bank failures are not subject to general U.S.
bankruptcy law.  Creditor priorities are absolute; i.e. general
creditors (including depositors) are entitled to full payment
before junior creditors and shareholders receive any payment.
Since the deposit insurer assumes the creditor position of the
depositors that it pays directly or indirectly (by  arranging
their assumption by another institution), it has substantial
flexibility in arranging a merger or otherwise disposing of the
assets of the failed institution.5/
It was generally cheaper for FSLIC to merge a failing S&L
than to pay off insured  deposits, especially since the
overwhelming share of S&L liabilities  were insured deposits.
However, some insolvent S&Ls had mostly high cost deposits, a- 19  -
poor public image an.l,  virtually no capacity to generate
profitable business.  Consequently, they had no franchise
value.  The cheapest solution in such a situation would have
been to close the institution, pay off its depositors and
liquidate or sell those assets that had any value.  Such
transactions, however, required sizable cash outlays, and the
FSLIC was short on cash.  Consequently, it used the deposit
payoff method less frequently than pure cost considerations
would have dictated.  Sometimes the simplest transaction  would
have involved the removal of troubled assets, inserting cash to
.aake  up the net worth shortfall and merging the "cleaned-up"
institution through a competitive bidding process.  However,
this type of transaction also required a significant cash
outlay, and so it too was avoided by a cash-short FSLIC.
Income Maintenance.  When S&Ls became insolvent in 1980
because of rising interest rates, FSLIC developed an
arrangement whereby it agreed to pay an acquiring institution
the difference between the earnings on a fixed-rate asset
portfolio of the failed S&L and the "cost of funds" for S&Ls
plus some defined added spread to cover non-interest operating
expenses.  The only major variable in this calcuiation 6/ was a
cost of funds index that covered some agreed-upon statistical
series that tracked deposit and borrowing costs for S&Ls
nationally or in a particular region or State.  This technique
(frequently  referred to as "income maintenance") was employed
satisfactorily in many transactions  by FSLIC and the FDIC.- 20  -
Basically, the deposit insurer took the future interest rate
risk on an existing  fixed rate asset portfolios assuring the
acquiring institution that it would at least break even on that
portfolio.
Since the cost of funds plus  the defined spread was
generally less than the prevailing market interest rate on
long-term assets during the early 1980s, the present value cost
of this transaction  was less than the cost of liquidating the
asset portfolio or paying the acquirer the difference between
book value and market vajue on the portfolio.  The transaction
was cost  effective on a present value basis: it would have
saved money for the deposit insurer had interest rates remained
constant.  When interest rates and the cost of funds actually
declined, the cost of the transaction to the deposit insurer
declined appreciably.
The income maintenance arrangement also minimized
immediate cash outlays.  The acquirer got the benefit of the
cash flow from the portfolio, which could be reinvested at
market rates, and whatever other value existed within the
failing S&L, and this was reflected in the pricing of the
transaction.
Taxes and Geographic Expansion.  FSLIC had other benefits
it  could offer ("sell")  acquiring institutions.  Certain of its
cash payments to acquirers could be treated as tax-free- 21 -
receipts.  This lowered the transaction cost for FSLIC, but not
for the government as a whole.  Because not all potential
acquirers were in a position to take full advantage of
potential tax benefits, inclusion of such benefits in
transactions actually reduced competitive bidding in many
instances.
Some acquiring institutions  were permitted to cross state
lines and get into preferred markets that had been closed t-
them.  Thus, in the early 1980s FSLIC could more easily dispGae
of failing S&Ls in California and Florida which were perceived
to be areas of strong future growth.  The FHLBB also found that
it could sell entry into some markets if a healthy institution
would agree to acquire a failing institution in a less
desirable market.  It should be noted, however, that
perceptions of coveted markets (Texas) and undesirable  markets
(New Jersey) in 1980 changed dramatically a few years later.
The income maintenance and other arrangements that the
FHLBB and FSLIC could offer kept the cost of merging insolvent
S&Ls relatively low compared with the amount of their assets.
However, the aggressive growth policies pursued by weak and
insolvent S&Ls bid up the cost of deposits and reduced the
spread between newly-acquired earning assets and deposits.
This made new and existing income  maintenance arrangements much
less attractive to FSLIC.  As interstate entry was given out
more frequently, the value of that arrangement (which  ceased to- 22 -
afford exclusivity)  diminished, and it was further  diminished
when certain interstate entry possibilities became possible for
commercial banks.  In addition, the serious asset quality
problems that subsequently  developed required different, more
time consuming and expensive, arrangements.  FSLIC developed
other arrangements to keep its costs down.  Some of these
involved considerable risk, and they probably contributed
significantly to future costs.
Accounting and Capital.  Assets of acquired institution
were marked to market and the discount was  booked on the asset
side of the balance sheet as good will.  This was typically
amortized over a very long period (30 years).  The actual
remaining life of the acquired assets was much shorter.  As the
assets approach maturity, their value approaches book value and
this appreciation (accretion)  is brought into current income.
While these accounting adjustments boost current income, it
sets the stage for reduced future income because good will
would have to be amortized for many years after there ceases to
be any offsetting income.  When interest rates subsequently
declined, the value of acquired assets appreciated and exceeded
the price at which they were booked.  The assets were sold by
many S&Ls and "profits"  were used to increase book capital
(rather than to reduce good will), while the good will "hole"
remained on the S&L's balance sheet.7/- 23 -
In connection with some acquisitions the FHLBB agreed to
arrangements whereby capital requirements would be waived or
phased in over a considerable period of time; thereby inviting
substantial leverage and risk taking. Sometimes FSLIC
assistance that was supposed to cover some of the net worth
shortfall of the acquired S&L was allowed to count toward
satisfying regulatory capital.  The accounting arrangemL  its
cited artificially boosted S&L performance and and regulatory
capital, and provided incentives for what otherwise would have
been inattractive  acquisitions.  In some instances acquisitions
with or without minimal FSLIC assistance kept marginal
(acquiring)  S&Ls solvent according to so-called regulatory
accounting standards.  While the apparent cost of the
transactions was kept relatively low, risk was substantially
increased.  If immediate cost is the principal determinant of
the best transaction and regulatory and accounting exceptions
are permitted, then weaker institutions will almost invariably
become the low bidders since they are exposing little real
value to risk and are less concerned about the need to earn
market returns on real net worth.  In a sense, a variant of
Gresham's law came into play as weak and insolvent bidders
drove away stronger potential bidders.
Phoenixes and Management Consignment.  The FHLBB merged
groups of insolvent S&Ls whica could not be readily sold
(because of their location or FSLIC's limited resources) into
so-called Phoenixes, and selected new boards of directors and- 24 -
chief executives for the institutions.  The institutions  were
generally directed to pursue conservative, low growth policies,
straighten out operating deficiencies and eventually (with
FSLIC assistance)  merge or recapitalize in the market place.
While there was considerable criticism of the program,
particularly related to competition from "nationalized"
institutions, the program probably prevented these institutions
from adding to FSLIC's costs.  The institutions in the program
generally avoided the credit problems that occurred in other
insolvent  S&Ls that were allowed to remain open.
Subsequently, FSLIC developed a "management  consignment"
program in which the management of troubled and poorly run S&Ls
was placed in the hands of other institutions  or individuals.
This was supposed to be a short-term program for damage control
and for facilitating the sale of the institutions.  However, in
most instances the problem S&Ls were not sold quickly.  Because
the arrangements had not contemplated longer-term  operation,
operating plans and appropriate  controls were not always put in
place.  Some managements actually pursued aggressive expansion
policies.  Some permitted the franchise to deteriorate as basic
services declined.  As a result, this program may have led to
net deterioration in value.  The kind of actions necessary to
straighten out records and systems so that an institution can
be sold in a few months are not necessarily the same actions
that should be taken to preserve value over an extended period
of time.8/- 25 -
Income  Maintenance on Nonperforming Assets.  In  FSLIC's
last transactions it generally guaranteed a positive spread on
nonperforming assets of insolvent S&Ls.  Acquirers frequently
were weak S&Ls or investors who made relatively small equity
investments.  That kept FSLIC's "apparent"  costs lower than
they would otherwise be because, as already noted, marginal
institutions  or investors were willing to pay a premium (in the
form of lower assistance) to be able to operate with
substantial leverage, allowing FSLIC (and ultimately the
taxpayer) to take most of the risk.  In most of these
transactions  FSLIC took an equity participation in the
acquiring institution so that it would recover some of its
costs if dramatic recovery occurs in distressed real estate
markets.
Despite efforts to cut cost, estimated future costs of
many of the later transactions (especially  those in Texas) are
very high --  in excess of 40 per cent of assets.  This resulted
from the poor asset quality of the acquired institutions which,
in many case, should have been closed or merged much earlier.
These transactions frequently encouraged acquiring institutions
to hold non-performing assets for an extended period of time in
order to realize market appreciation, since their carrying cost
* has been fully funded by FSLIC.  However, the transactions
discouraged rational sell-hold decisions and probably have had
a perverse effect on bringing about appropriate adjustments in- 26
real estate markets.  Moreover, the transactions may have kept
the important asset collection function out of the hands of
more competent institutions.
These transactions contain substantial risk.  It is not
clear that, in the long run, they will prove to be cheap
compared with transactions where adequate assistance was
provided to well-capitalized acquirers --  assuming adequate
funding  had been available to FSLIC.  Certainly these
transactions prevented the shrinkage in the aggregate size of
S&Ls that would have otherwise occurred.  And it is clear that
these transactions  distorted market conditions,  made it
difficult for well-capitalized institutions to compete, and
made it virtually impossible to carry out effective supervisory
policy.9/
Policies for Handling Failures: A Summary.  In many
respects the transactions and tactics used by FSLIC in order to
dispose of failing S&Ls were imaginative  and innovative.  Some
of them (taking  on existing interest rate risk) probably
reduced costs without creating other problems.  Some
arrangements (tax incentives)  at best shifted costs from one
pocket of government to another.  The selective "sale"  of
exceptions to limits on geographic expansion tends to transfer
costs to competing institutions in a manner that may be unfair.
In addition, it may have actually delayed a salutary more
universal elimination of barriers to geographic expansion.  At-27  -
the same time that FSLIC and the FHLBB sought to achieve
marginal cost reductions, they created enormous perverse
incentives among weak and insolvent S&Ls: risk taking was
encouraged; accurate reporting of financial conditions was
discouraged; prudential standards were relaxed through
accounting devices and capital forbearance; and the ultimate
cost of the S&L problem was significantly increased.
During the early phase of FSLIC transactions (about
1980-83), S&Ls could earn favorable spreads on new money and
portions of failing  S&Ls were perceived to have considerable
value.  Subsequently, spreads narrowed and insolvent S&Ls
offered very little to potential buyers.  Nevertheless, FSLIC
continued to structure transactions as though there were
considerable franchise value in failing S&Ls, at least in part
because more cash would have been required to do otherwise.
The loss in S&L franchise value reflected increased competition
in the deposit and mortgage markets and the development of
mortgage-derivative instruments.  However, the policies pursued
by the FHLBB and FSLIC, which encouraged S&L growth and
prevented S&L shrinkage, that would have otherwise occurred
through the failure process, importantly  contributed to the
loss of value among S&Ls, including healthy S&Ls.- 28  -
IV.  FDIC Experience with Mutual Savings Banks
Beginning in the late 1970s the FDIC encountered interest
rate related problems among the Mutual Savings Banks (MSBs) it
insured and supervised,  and these problems were very similar to
those experienced by S&Ls at that time.  While MSBs had broader
asset powers than S&Ls, most MSBs, particularly those outside
New England, had not used these powers to reduce their interest
rate risk.  In New York, where mortgage rates had been
constrained by a state usury ceiling, MSBs  had  large portfolios
of long-term corporate bonds whose duration (and, hence,
interest rate risk) exceeded that of amortizing mortgages.  In
addition, mortgages of MSBs, which were on properties in slower
growing states, turned over less rapidly than those of S&Ls
which had a greater presence in the faster growing south and
west.  About half the assets of FDIC-insured MSBs were in New
York state where the thrift interest rate problem was probably
greater than anywhere else.
The FDIC had several advantages compared with FSLIC and
the FHLBB.  In 1980 the FDIC's net worth was about twice as
large as FSLIC's, and the 350 FDIC-insured MSBs accounted for
only about 15 per cent of the FDIC's exposure.  The
institutions were relatively large and could be closely
monitored by an ongoing supervisory staff, once the basic
interest rate problem was identified.  Commercial banks, which
accounted for the remainder of the FDIC's exposure, had far- 29 -
less interest rate risk.  Thus, the FDIC was in a position to
deal with the MSB problem more confidently and directly.  While
the problem could substantially reduce the FDIC's net worth, it
did  not seriously  threaten  its solvency  --  unless  interest
rates continued to rise.
Beginning in December 1980 the FDIC arranged several
assisted mergers for failing  MSBs.  For the most part these
transactions provided "income  maintenance" on most of the  fixed
rate portfolio of the failing institution.  This served to
eliminate the interest rate risk and operating loss on the
fixed rate portfolio of the failing institution.  The cost of
these transactions  was considerably less than the cost of
liquidating the under-water portfolio of the failing
institutions.  While the FDIC continued to take substantial
interest rate risk, this turned out to be a financial benefit
when subsequent rate declines served to reduce the FDIC's cost
significantly.
The average cost of the ten MSBs that were merged between
1980 and 1982 turned out to be less than ten per cent of their
assets.10/  For the most part, the transactions provided
sufficient real assistance to acquiring institutions  so that
serious problems did not persist.  However, there was some
compromise to existing capital and supervisory standards.  The
most aggressive bidders for failing institutions  were
frequently other MSBs whose financial condition was not very- 30 -
strong and, if rigorous qualifying standards for bidders had
been enforced, would have been excluded.  Faced with choosing
between "cheap" transactions and more expensive ones with
greater certainty about their success, the FDIC generally chose
the former,  and for the most part, got away with it.  (In a
few instances acquiring MSBs did get into difficulty and they
currently are considered to be problems by the FDIC.)  Failing
MSBs generally were located in competitive  banking markets that
were not coveted by out-of-state institutions.  As a result the
FDIC could not benefit through the sale of regulatory
exceptions as did FSLIC; nor did the FDIC have the authority to
provide other entry opportunities in exchange for aggressive
bids on institutions in less favored markets.
Banking legislation enacted in 1982 included a provision
whereby thrift institutions approaching book insolvency could
apply for "net worth certificates" (a  paper exchange that would
satisfy regulatory capital requirements) from the FDIC and
FSLIC to cover a portion of their losses, and delay or
forestall legal insolvency.  The FDIC implemented the
arrangement for virtually all eligible MSBs and, in the
process, imposed significant restrictions on the policies of
participating MSBs.  They had to submit detailed operating
plans which were monitored by the FDIC.  Restrictions generally
prevented the institutions from bidding aggressively for funds
and acquiring risky assets.  These arrangements, combined with
the conservative behavior that characterized most MSBs and- 31 -
healthy regional economies, generally kept the MSBs from
getting into loan quality problems.
When interest rates declined after 1982 and again in
1985-86  most of the MSBs under the net worth certificate
program returned to profitability.  Many were subsequently  able
to strengthen their capital position through retained earnings
and by converting to atock institutions.  Some were merged or
acquired by stronger institutions or investor groups without
any FDIC assistance.  Had interest rates not declined, most of
the MSBs in the net worth assistance program probably would
have ultimately failed.  By limiting the expansion of these
MSBs and the Wind of assets that could be acquired, the FDIC
limited its risk.  The institutions involved in the program
typically were reporting sizeable operating losses under
existing accounting rules.  However, if market value
accounting had been employed, most of the institutions,  while
reporting a sizable insolvency,  would have been operating close
to a break eveza  basis.11/  If interest savings from delayed
cash outlays by the FDIC are factored in, the net worth
certificate program probably afforded a positive expected
return to the FDIC, assuming a flat interest rate scenario.
The FDIC's cost of handling failing MSBs was about $2
billion on institutions  with assets of about $150 billion in
1980.  On S&Ls with assets of about four times that size in
1980,  the cost  to FSLIC  and  the taxpayer  is likely  to be at- 32 -
least 40 'imes as large as the MSB cost.  While luck,
institutional  culture and regional economic performance all
contributed to the difference in results, there is an
overwhelming message or lesson from the different experience.
Closing or appropriately constraining insolvent institutions is
essential if the exposure of the deposit insurer is to be kept
within reasonable bounds.
V. Recent Efforts to Resolve S&L Problem
In 1987 it became clear that FSLIC did not have sufficient
resources to handle its insurance obligations in connection
with failing S&Ls.  Congress enacted legislation that provided
a vehicle for the FHLBB to borrow approximately *10 billion
over a three year period, and finance its obligation over a
much longer period out of increased assessment income.
However, by early 1988 it became apparent that the $10 billion
supplement to FSLIC resources was going to be far short of its
needs.  "Consensus"  estimates of these needs escalated from $30
billion to $50 billion to $75 billion throughout the year. 12/
However, the FHLBB was slow to acknowledge that FSLIC resources
would be substantially short of ultimate needs.  In its 1987
Annual Revort (which  did not go to printing before late 1988)
the FHLBB maintained that it would have sufficient resources
over the next several years to handle failing S&Ls and
eventually attain solvency. 13/- 33 -
The FHLBB and FSLIC stepped up their activity in
"resolving"  insolvent S&Ls throughout the year, despite limited
cash resources.  This was done through the issuance of FSLIC
notes (IOUs)  and obligations for future cash and note payments
related to income maintenance arrangements on non-performing
assets.  Many of the transactions were criticized in Congress
and elsewhere because of tax benefits given to acquirers,
modest capital requirements imposed and the inappropriate  asset
collection incentives in the transactions.  By the end of 1988,
FSLIC had closed or merged 230 insolvent S&Ls with assets of
S114 billion at an estimated present value cost of $38.7
billion.  The pace of activity was accelerated at the end of
the year (after the election) and as certain tax benefits were
scheduled to expire.  In December alone 76 insolvent S&Ls were
merged at an estimated present value cost to FSLIC of $17.4
billion.  By the end of 1988 FSLIC's outstanding obligation in
connection with transactions  disposing of insolvent S&Ls were
approximately $50 billion.  Still a large number of insolvent
S&Ls remained open.
Congress, while critical of the PHLBB and FSLIC, was
reluctant to address the S&L problem through new legislation in
1988, a presidential election year.  Early in 1989 the new
administration submitted a comprehensive legislative  package to
Congress that was designed to deal with the S&L problem over a
period of several years.  The legislation, in a form reasonably- 34 -
close to the initial set of proposals, was enacted and signed
into law in August 1989.  The basic structure of that set of
proposals and the emerging strategy for dealing with the S&L
problem are discussed below.
The Legislation.  Under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, t  .id  Enforcement Act of 1989 (currently
referred to as F1RREA), FSLIC is merged into the FDIC, although
two separate deposit insurance funds will be maintained.
FSLIC's previous obligations (about $50 billion) under
"completed"  transactions that involve future commitments would
be assumed by the Federal government as would the cost of
resolving existing S&L problems over the next several years.
There would be tougher future regulation, supervision  and
enforcement for S&Ls with an increased role played by the FDIC
and the Treasury --the FHLBB would have a single administrator
who would report to Treasury and be a member of an enlarged
FDIC Board of Directors.  Capital and accounting standards of
S&Ls would become similar to those applicable for banks
(following  a phase-in period), and in some areas there would be
modest curtailment of S&L powers.  Deposit insurance
assessments would be raised for both S&Ls and FDIC-insured
banks.  In general there would be greater capital and
supervisory discipline imposed  on S&Ls.
The need for S&Ls as separate institutions, subject to
different regulation, supervision and tax laws from those- 35 -
applicable to banks, has been questioned by many.  Under the
new regulatory environment it may be difficult for S&Ls to
operate profitably, and stronger S&Ls may eventually convert to
commercial banks.  Nevertheless, S&Ls and the FHLBs would
continue to exist, at least for the present.
At least as important as the institutional  changes imposed
on S&Ls is the developing strategy for handling existing S&L
insolvencies.  The comments that follow in this area reflect,
in part, a reading of public statements by FDIC and Treasury
officials, and Congressional debate leading up to enactment of
FIRREA. 14/  At the outset those S&Ls that are most clearly
insolvent (according to regulatory standards) were or are being
placed into conservatorships under the direction of the FDIC.
The institutions would cease making loans, other than the most
risk free loans; operating expenses would be reduced; and data
and other relevant information  would be gathered to facilitate
the sale of the institutions.  In some cases, the S&Ls had
already been subject to enforcement action that had limited
their activities; in other cases, the conservatorships  have
probably served to limit risk and cut losses.
Insolvent S&Ls will be closed and then either liquidated
or merged.  In the later case, no special tax benefits will be
available to acquiring institutions  or investors.  The latter
will be expected to capitalize the acquisition in accordance
with prevailing standards --  it is likely that there would be- 36 -
few, if any, exceptions made with respect to the capital
requirements imposed on investors or depository institutions
acquiring insolvent S&Ls.  Acquiring institutions  will not be
expected to assume expensive, purchased deposits or to acquire
nonperforming assets.  Thus, even merged S&Ls would be expected
to shrink considerably.  The transactions are expected to be
relatively "clean."  What is likely to be acquired through
mergers or acquisitions will be principally performing assets
and "good" or core deposits.  Even on that basis, it is not
expected that acquirers will pay substantial "premiums" for S&L
franchises.  In the present environment, it takes a relatively
clean, well-run S&L to earn a market return on capital if the
institution is appropriately capitalized.  As the size and
number of S&Ls shrink and competition from insolvent
institutions  disappears, margins may eventually increase to
levels  where potential acquirers will pay premiums for S&L
franchises.
There are likely to be few, if any, special devices that
will significantly reduce insurance costs (some existing
interest  rate risk might be taken by the insurer to encourage
acquiring institutions to purchase performing assets and this
may modestly reduce costs).  For the most part it is recognized
that in today's environment those arrangements that could
reduce costs (like capital forbearance) entail substantial risk
and, once their supervisory and other implications  are factored
in, they may not actually reduce expected costs.  Moreover,- 37 -
there is a strong aversion to repeating the mistakes that were
recently  made.
In most cases there is not a close link between S&L assets
and liabilities --  depositors are not the principal borrowers
from the institution.  Even when depositors do obtain mortgages
from local S&Ls, most mortgages are subsequently sold,
securitized  or otherwise repackaged so that they do not remain*
with the original lender.  It is not necessary for an acquiring
institution  to be the collector of the assets of the insolvent
S&L in order to retain customer deposits.  In the case of
troubled assets, particularly larger mortgages on commercial
properties, there is apt to be little advantage in keeping the
work-out operation within the acquired S&L.  Better collection
results can probably be achieved by providing appropriate
incentives to institutions  with expertise in real estate and
collections.  Thus, there are apt to be simple, relatively
clean S&L transactions with the difficult asset collection task
handled elsewhere.  How effective that collection process is
handled would importantly affect the ultimate cost of working
through the S&L problem.  Imagination will be important in
providing collection arrangements where the insurer can share
in the upside with private contractors.
Simple, clean S&L transactions should result in few repeat
problems, minimize undesirable competitive results from
assisted transactions and make it possible to implement uniform- 38 -
and strict supervisory  policy.  There are currently about 2,900
S&Ls in the U.S.  About 500 are clearly insolvent, and
disposing of most of them will require federal outlays.  Many
other S&Ls currently are not viable institutions.  They will
probably have to merge or be recapitalized, and it would not be
surprising if the S&L population is half its current number by
1995.
FIRREA provides S50 billion over three years to dispose of
operating, insolvent S&Ls.  If that figure is correct, cash
outlays to effect transactions will be considerably higher
since problem assets would be removed and sold over an extended
period of time.  Some provision exists to facilitate the
additional, temporary funding.  Many believe that the $50
billion figure is apt to prove low --  much will depend on
interest rates and real estate recovery in the southwest.  If
there is a consensus estimate today, it is probably closer to a
present value cost of about $60 billion.  That is in addition
to FSLIC's outstanding obligations on previous transactions,
estimated to be about $50 billion on a present value basis.
Thus, we are looking at a present value cost in excess of $100
billion.  The actual budget outlays will be much higher because
(estimates  exceed $160 billion) because expenditures will be
spread out over time so that future  dollar outlays will be
greater then present value costs.  In addition, funding needed
cash will result in future interest expenses. 15/  While some
of this cost will be borne by future deposit insurance- 39 -
assessments, the majority of it will be paid by general
Treasury revenues.
In economic terms most of the $100 billion (or
thereabouts) cost has already been incurred over the past
several years.  S&L losses have either been reflected in
previously-reported losses or are buried in existing balance
sheets.  To the extent those losses reflect the financing of
bad real estate or other projects or the wasting of resources,
those costs have been incurred  and the resources have already
been wasted.  The deposit insurance system was obligated to
cover most of the losses, and, at least implicitly, the federal
government stood behind the insurance system.  Thus, over the
past several years the federal government has incurred an
(unbooked) obligation, most of which was not recognized in the
reported budget deficit.  From an economic standpoint the
federal deficit was understated.  Paying the bills will
facilitate the closing of S&Ls, the assumption of their
obligations  and the disposing of distressed assets.  However,
it generally won't involve any significant real wealth
transfers.  Owners of insolvent S&Ls won't benefit.  Insured
depositors in insolvent S&Ls won't receive any more for their
claims than they had previously anticipated.
Unfortunately, in presenting an otherwise satisfactory S&L
package, the  Administration and the press did not develop the
point that most of the real cost has already been incurred and- 40 -
that the eoonomy has already paid most of the bill through
wasted resources and unbooked obligations of the deposit
insurance system and the Federal government.  The
Administration's proposals involved the creation of a new
borrowing entity so that most of the cost of resolving the S&L
problem would be kept off the federal budget.  The majority in
Congress favored more direct, on-budget, financing, and a
last-minute compromise developed so that part of the cost is on
the fiscal 1989 budget and much of the future cost is
off-budget.16/
While the current cost estimates are inflated, $100
billion is still a lot of money.  It is about two per cent of
current GNP.  It substantially  exceeds all past earnings of
thrift institutions in the U.S.  And not included in the $100
billion figure are the depleted capital accounts of failed and
operating thrifts and the adverse impact that the S&L problem
has had on operating depository institutions, even well-run
institutions.  Thus, it is  important that we gain an
appreciation of what happened to S&Ls and why, and the
concluding section of this paper the development of the S&L
problem and its principal causes are reviewed along with an
attempt to place them into perspective.- 41 -
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In several important respects the institutional
arrangements that characterized S&Ls represented a disaster
waiting to happen.  The combination of economic events in
recent years and the government policies pursued assured that
it would be a very large disaster.  Prior to the late 1970s
S&Ls were primarily mutually-owned institutions with limited
management capabilities, limited investment options and
virtually unlimited interest rate exposure.  The industry was
so closely tied to real estate activity that conflicts of
interest and credit concentrations were accepted behavior.  The
regulatory-supervisory system in place was so closely tied to
the industry that the system  was severely handicapped in
identifying problems and imposing appropriate discipline on
S&Ls.
Beginning in the late 1970s interest rates increased
substantially, reaching levels that were wholly unanticipated
by regulators and economists alike.  The borrow-short,
lend-long policies of S&Ls caused substantial operating losses
that depleted the modest capital levels existing in most
institutions.  On their own and with the encouragement of
regulators many S&Ls pursued high growth policies that
attempted to minimize the relative importance of low-yielding
fixed rate mortgages in their asset portfolios.  They also
moved into riskier areas of lending, in part in response to- 42 -
more permissive asset powers.  While some S&Ls benefited from
such policies, the industry as a whole did not.  Funding costs
were bid up, returns on quality assets were squeezed and
overall asset quality deteriorated substantially, at least in
part, because of the overly-aggressive lending by S&Ls.  On a
mark-to-market basis most S&Ls were insolvent in the early
1980s.  It was in their "economic interest" to incur
substantial risk in the hope of attaining solvency.  The fact
that virtually all deposits were fully insured and borrowings
were secured, eliminated any significant  creditor discipline
from S&Ls.  Virtually all the risk was assumed by FSLIC, the
deposit insurer.  Consequently, it was essential for FSLIC and
the FHLBB to minimize insurance risk by closing insolvent S&Ls
or, at a minimum, restraining their growth and assumption of
additional risk.
For the most part supervision did not restrain S&L growth
and risk, and eventually a large share of S&Ls began to face
serious asset quality problems.  These problems more than
offset the benefits that arose when interest rates and funding
costs eventually declined.  Asset quality problems were
exacerbated by fraud committed by S&L managers and customers.
The absence of any real capital stake eliminated an important
potential deterrent to fraud as did the poor quality of
supervision.  Moreover, the pressure on S&L managers to find
high-yielding assets contributed to their being victimized by
dishonest developers and other borrowers.- 43 -
In many respects the policies pursued by FSLIC and the
FHLBB in dealing with failing S&Ls also exacerbated the
problem.  Insolvent institutions  were merged in transactions
that provided capital forbearance, accounting exceptions and
other arrangements that covered up weaknesses and further
encouraged growth.  This contributed to reduced margins and
lower asset quality within the industry as a whole and
undermined needed, tough supervisory policy.  Many of the
policies pursued to handle failing S&Ls were dictated by a
shortage of cash and a desire to effect what were perceived to
be cheap transactions.  In the aggregate, however, costs were
not contained and the policies pursued contributed to
additional risk taking and losses.
Other factors  also contributed to the S&L problem.  Rising
energy prices in the late 1970s and early 80s encouraged
substantial expansion in resirdential  and commercial real estate
activity in the southwest and especially in Texas.  S&Ls,
including many from other parts of the country, invested
heavily in these markets.  They suffered severely when these
markets subsequently deteriorated.  However, it would not be
altogether accurate to characterize S&Ls as passive victims of
market developments.  The aggressive lending policies of S&Ls
in Texas and elsewhere contributed importantly to over-building
and the extent of the subsequent decline.- 44 -
Developments in deposit and mortgage markets in the 1980s
made these markets far more competitive than they used to be so
that favorable margins on low-risk retail activities of thrifts
are no longer available.  In today's markets it takes a very
efficient, well-managed thrift institution to earn market
returns on a risk-adjusted basis in the deposit-mortgage
business.  Some of the high growth policies pursued by S&Ls and
their regulator contributed to over expansion in these markets
and to the tough competitive environment that currently
prevails.  Changes in tax laws in 1986-87  diminished the
attractiveness of certain kinds of real estate investments, and
from the standpoint of problem S&Ls and those involved in
selling distressed real estate these changes came at precisely
the wrong time.
It took a special combination of factors to make the S&L
problem as large as it currently is.  Interest rate movements
were substantial.  Nevertheless, the FDIC's experience with
MSBs suggests that the consequences of the interest rate
problem did not have to result in enormous costs.  The real
estate decline in Texas was extreme.  Nevertheless, weaknesses
in regulatory and supervisory policies were major contributors
to the problem.  So too was a reluctances  within the
Administration and Congress to address the developing problems
more forcefully and in a more timely manner.  Allowing insured
insolvent institutions to operate, grow and take on more risk
was the major source of today's problem.  One can readily find- 45 -
points at which policy changes, and aai  earlier willingness to
recognize the extent of the problem, and address it would have
significantly reduced its cost.
While some aspects of the S&L problem may be unique to the
U.S. system, one can readily find comparable situations in
banking systems around the world, particularly in developing
countries.  Interest rates and asset prices have been quite
variable in many of these countries, and financial institutions
have often been constrained in their ability to diversify and
hedge against risk.  Prudential regulation and supervision
frequently have been inadequate,  and they have been subject to
special pressures in connection with movements toward
liberalizing the activities permitted to institutions that
often lack experience in these new areas.  In many cases a
substantial portion of the banking system is insolvent, though
institutions  are permitted to operate and take on additional
risk.  In one way or another losses are borne by the economy
and will be paid for by the general public.  Still it is
difficult for governments and banking authorities to
acknowledge these losses and pursue policies that will bring an
end to them, despite the fact that delay will raise costs and
cause distortions in resource allocation as it has in the U.S.
Finally, in some areas the U.S. experience with respect to
mortgage market innovations and the perfection of markets is- 46 -
apt to be very foreign to the situation in many developing
countries.  However, some of the U.S. experience in these areas
and the fallout from increased  market perfection may be worth
careful study by those in well developed financial markets, as
well as those developing countries with more sophisticated and
competitive financial systems.- 47  -
TABLE 1
Selected Balance Sheet Data for FSLIC-Insured Thrifts
(Year-end data;  S amounts in billion)
Year  Number  Assets  Deposits Borrowing  Capital**
Regulatory  Tangible
1970  4,365  170.5  141.6  10.8  11.9
1975  4,078  329.0  277.7  20.5  19.1
1978  4,053  510.8  420.4  41.9  28.1
1979  4,039  566.7  459.5  54.8  31.6
1980  4,002  615.3  498.7  63.4  32.4
1981  3,779  509.4  512.3  88.8  27.8
1982  3,343  686.2*  550.0  97.8  25.3  3.7
1983  3,183  814.6  667.4  98.4  32.8  2.8
1984  3,136  977.5  784.5  137.9  37.2  4.0
1985  3,246  1,069.5  844.0  156.9  46.8  9.6
1986  3,220  1,165.3  890.3  196.5  53.1  17.3
1987  3,147  1,250.9  932.6  249.9  46.4  9.1
1988  2,949  1,351.5  971.5  299.2  56.4  21.4
*  Beginning in 1982 certain loan reserves (about $15 billion in 1982
were subtracted from assets.  In previous years these reserves were
shown as liabilities.
**  Regulatory capital includes qualifying subordinated  debt, net worth
and income capital certificates, and certain other items.  Tangible
net worth excludes these, deferred loan losses and good will. 17/
Data are from various Federal Home Loan Bank Board sources.- 48  -
TABLE 2
Interest Rates, Interest Income, Expenses & Earnings of S&Ls
Year  Average Market Interest  Rates  S&L Cost  S&L Mortgage  S&L
Return
3-mo. Bills  Mortg Yields  of Funds  Yields  on Assets
1976  4.99  9.75  6.38  8.00  0.63
1977  5.27  8.97  6.44  8.26  0.77
1978  7.22  9.49  6.67  8.50  0.82
1979  10.03  10.71  7.47  8.86  0.67
1980  11.62  12.67  8.94  9.34  0.14
1981  13.92  14.74  10.92  9.91  -0.73
1982  10.74  15.12  11.38  10.68  -0.65
1983  8.62  12.68  9.83  11.17  0.27
1984  9.70  12.52  10.03  11.65  0.12
1985  7.54  11.58  9.19  11.52  0.39
1986  5.97  10.25  8.06  10.65  0.02
1987  5.82  9.32  7.20  9.70  -0.64
1988  6.67  9.20  7.50  9.65  -C.96
S&L data from various Federal Home Loan Bank Board Sources 17/- 49  -
FOOTNOTES
1.  For several years officials at the FHLBB and others have
argued that states irresponsibly expanded powers for
state-chartered S&Ls (insured  by the FSLIC) and that federal
regulators were powerless to restrict their behavior.  In fact
the FHLBB had substantial authority with respect to determining
minimum capital standards for all FSLIC-insured institutions
(as  do bank regulators for banks).  Capital requirements can
and have been related to the mix of assets and liabilities.
The FHLBB had authority to set higher capital requirements on
equity investments,  direct real estate investments or on other
selected "risky" assets.
2.  During the same period borrowing by FSLIC-insured S&Ls
increased by more than 350 per cent.  Borrowed funds, virtually
all of which are secured, currently account for about 23 per
cent of the liabilities of FSLIC-insured S&Ls.
3.  It is easier to defend the risky behavior of insolvent
S&Ls.  If they were extremely successful, they might become
solvent again and remain in business.  If they were stock
institutions, their shareholders would benefit.  If they were
unsuccessful, losses would fall on the FSLIC.  The FHLBB and
FSLIC were public institutions.  Their losaes were public
losses.
4.  During most of the past decade the income reports of
troubled S&Ls do not fully reflect their unfavorable
performance.  Troubled institutions tend to be slow in
reporting loan losses.  Selective asset sales permit
institutions to report "gains" while they continue holding
asset portfolios with below average yields.  If one focused
solely on income reports, he would estimate a much smaller S&L
problem than has actually existed.
5.  The combination of clear-cut creditor priorities, the
deposit insurer standing in the role of general creditor and
courts that are reluctant to delay transactions  because of
frivolous creditor challenges facilitate quick acquisitions of
failing banks and S&Ls.  In addition,  the FHLBB and FSLIC had
considerable authority to arrange mergers or acquisitions  of
failing mutually-owned S&Ls without actually closing them.
6.  Where there is an actual pool of mortgages and bonds that
may pre-pay or,default, the yield and the size of the portfolio
could vary from the original agreement.  The FDIC in usirg this
type of transaction found that it could replicate the size
(utilizing  pre-payment assumptions) and yield on a long-term
portfolio in what it called a "defined asset base."  The
acquiring institutions  was then free to hold or sell off any
part of the portfolio without affecting the assistance- 50  -
transaction.  This simplified record keeping. In addition, the
flexibility  afforded the acquiror added value to the
transaction (it  was not a zero sum situation) that could be
reflected in the bidding process, and reduce the FDIC's cost.
7.  Acquired assets were booked at current market value which
generally was below the original book value.  The difference
between book and market was good will which showed up as an
"intangible"  asset to be amortized over a long period.  As
acquired assets approached maturity, assuming constant interest
rates, they would appreciate in value and this appreciation was
taken into current income.  Because the assets matured faster
than the write off of good will, this tended to boost
early-year earnings.  However, when interest rates declined,
the acquired assets appreciated further.  Many S&Ls sold the
assets in order to boost current earnings.  However they were
left with substantial good will on their books without any
future accretions to offset the write off of future good will.
8.  Over an extended period of time, quality staff, faced with
limited and uncertain future prospects will leave.  While it
may be appropriate to limit new lending, failure to lend over
an extended period of time will reduce any franchise value in
the institution.  Legal and other action to perfect property
liens and maintain value in troubled assets require a
relatively long time horizon, and failures in these areas can
dissipate asset value.  These are only a few examples of
potential problems associated with extended holding actions.
They are not unique to the "management  consignment" program.
They are apt to occur in any situation where a failing
depository institution is placed in prolonged holding status --
a  process that is not uncommon in some banking systems.
9.  Transactions that paid off high cost deposits or otherwise
led to shrinking the balance sheet of problem S&Ls would have
led to lower funding costs for competing S&Ls.  The latter also
had to face competition from institutions that were permitted
to operate with low capital ratios and could afford to price
assets and liabilities  accordingly.  Supervisors had difficulty
enforcing capital requirements for solvent S&Ls at the same
time that assistance transactions condoned lower capital
ratios.
10. In several instances interest rate declines reduced costs
considerably compared with original present value estimates.
At the time 10 per cent seemed low compared with the mark't
value net worth of the institutions.  However, 10 per cent was
not so low compared with the FDIC's pre 1980 commercial bank
experience.  It was low, however, compared with the FDIC's post
1982 experience.
11. A bond or mortgage, acquired at par with a coupon or
interest rate that is significantly  below market will produce
low interest earnings earnings throughout its remaining life.- 51  -
If the mortgage is marked to market based on current interest
rates, a  loss will be immediately  recognized.  However, a
larger share of future amortization payments will show up as
current interest income.  In the case of the bond, once the
loss is  realized, that discount will be accreted and be brought
into current interest income as the bond approaches maturity.
These market value adjustments bring the income statement more
in line with "economic income," and they afford a more
appropriate basis for determining whether an institution  should
be closed or kept alive.
12. Oversight on the Condition of the Financial Services
Industry, Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 25 and 26, '988,
pp. 19-176.
13. Federal Home Loan Bank Board 1987 Annual Report, Washington
D.C. 1988, pp. 8-10.
14. The writer has participated in FDIC planning efforts
related to the handling of failing S&Ls and the comments that
follow reflect the consensus of the participants within and
outside the FDIC.
15. This figure does not include previous costs that were
already paid, including the depletion of FSLIC income and
accumulated net worth and the accumulated net worth and paid in
capital of failed and failing S&Ls.
16. Twenty billion dollars of the cost of resolving S&L
problems are to come from outlays charged to the fiscal 1989
budget year (which  ends September 30 1989).  Under present
practices, late adjustments to the budget are not considered to
be violations of constraints imposed on the federal deficit.
17. It,  should be appreciated that S&L data on earnings (which
affect capital) have been reported more favorably than they
should have been.  Accounting rules have permitted over
statement of earnings; gains on asset sales have been realized
quickly while losses are deferred; and many S&Ls have
understated loan losses.- 52  -
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